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REFLECTIONS ON NEW YORK'S "STOP-AND-FRISK" LAW AND ITS
CLAIMED UNCONSTITUTIONALITY*
RICI-LARD H. KUH
Mr. Kuh is Coordinator for the New York State Combined Council of Law Enforcement Officials. He has also served, until recently, as Assistant District Attorney in New York County in
charge of the Criminal Court Bureau.
Does New York's new "Stop-and-Frisk" law constitute a threat to the civil liberties of New
Yorkers? Does it permit the police to require information of persons on mere suspicion of possible
wrongdoing? Is there any common law precedent for the law? In the following article, Mr. Kuh
discusses these and other questions, of interest not only to New Yorkers, but also to others concerned with the general area of detention and arrest.-EDrrOR.

Some lawyers, who seem to share the gossip
columnists' vanity of boasting "I-told-you-so,"
have been dooming New York State's recently
enacted "Stop-and-Frisk" law as "unconstitutional." This omniscience, proclaimed before the
new law's enactment, was largely inspired at the
time by defense attorneys, political professionals,
and others confirmed in their habit of fighting any
and every strengthening of police power. But even
since the bill was signed into law in early March,
1964 (it became effective July 1, 1964), there have
been those at the bar who have continued to
pontificate what they contend is the statute's
clear and obvious fallibility.
The more positive of these Cassandras-in-law
assume that constitutionality-or the lack of it-is
fixed and readily discoverable. Changes in attitudes
on the part of our high courts, both state and
federal, especially in the criminal field during the
past three decades should demonstrate to all with
legal training that certain predictability on an
issue of constitutionality is rare.
The truly judicial judge (and lawyer), analyzing
a police statute's constitutionality, will not condemn solely because in his pre-judgment extending

police power is dangerous. He will recognize the
wisdom of the Frankfurter admonition that "It
makes a great deal of difference whether you start
with an answer or with a problem." He will wish
to consider closely the wording of the particular
* A summarized version of this article appeared in
the New York Law Journal on May 29, 1964. Since
that date, in its opinion in People v. Migud Rirera,

14 N.Y.2d 441 (July 10, 1964), the New York Court of
Appeals sustained the right of police to stop persons
upon reasonable suspicion of felonious conduct, and in
so holding commented upon New York's "Stop-andFrisk" law.

law that is involved; of course, existing case law
may lend at least some guidance; he will have
dearly in mind the facts of the particular case
that brings that enactment to the reviewing court's
attention; and he will wish to be fully informed
about the background-the facts of community
life-that led to the statute's enactment and that
reflects its impact in practice. Appellate judges are
likely to lack accurate information concerning this
last factor; they are far distant from the overcrowded streets that are crime's seedbeds. It is
the briefing and argument of counsel that are
chargeable with bringing this reality, not solely
fine-spun legal theory, to the distant heights of
appellatedom.
Recognizing these items that bear on the
ultimate decision as to constitutionality, let us
look at New York's new "Stop-and-Frisk" statute.
THE WORDING OF THE STATUTE

The statute adds a new provision, section 180-a,
to New York's Code of Criminal Procedure:
"Temporary questioning of persons In public
places; search for weapons. 1. A police officer
may stop any person abroad in a public place
whom he reasonably suspects is committing,
has committed or is about to commit a felony
or any of the crimes specified in section five
hundred fifty-two of this chapter, and may
demand of him, his name, address and an explanation of his actions.
2. When a police officer has stopped a person
for questioning pursuant to this section and
reasonably suspects that he is in danger of life
or limb, he may search such person for a dangerous weapon. If the police officer finds such a
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weapon or any other thing the possession of
which may constitute a crime, he may take and
keep it until the completion of the questioning,
at which time he shall either return it, if lawfully possessed, or arrest such person."
Comparison of this language with the characterization of the new law as expressed by some of its
detractors, suggests that the resemblance is, at
best, coincidental. A so-called "Committee for
Fair Police Practice" (self-annointed) summoning
-in handbills printed both in English and in
Spanish-the neighboring citizenry to an uptown
protest meeting after the Governor's signature had
transmuted the bill into law, proclaimed: "Do you
know that the State legislature has passed bills
giving the police the power to stop, question and
search you whenever and wherever they want." The
new act's twice-repeated phrase "reasonably
suspects"-dearly rendering the officer's judgment
reviewable by the courts-was ignored. That the
police power conferred was limited to actions of
persons "abroad in a public place" was similarly
misconstrued. Nor was any suggestion conveyed
that the stopping might be only for felonies and a
limited number of the more serious misdemeanors.
So much for learning, from its wording, what
the new statute clearly is not. But what is it? Is it,
indeed, so vague a piece of criminal legislation that
reviewing courts must find it unconstitutional? The
new law's use of the phrase "reasonably.suspects"
should not render it so. "Reasonable"--be it in
the phrase "reasonable man," "reasonable doubt,"
or "reasonable cause"-is the law's most commonly
interpreted, necessarily somewhat ambiguous,
single word. And although its current handmaiden,
"suspects," may be virginal to the vocabulary of
New York criminal procedure, common senseand any dictionary-will indicate that it is simply
a step down from the word "believes." It should
be just as susceptible of legal usage as has been
that more common word. "Believes," concededly,
connotes a greater degree of certainty on the part
of the actor, but the word itself is no simpler, no
more fited, no more inflexible, than is the word
"suspects." In brief, "reasonably suspects," as used
in the "Stop-and-Frisk" statute, refers to a conglomerate of such circumstances as would merit
the sound suspicions of a properly alert policeman,
performing his sworn duty.
Unhappily, unsubstantiated charges have been
made suggesting that New York's proposal of
stopping suspicious persons was wholly without

common law antecedent: that it was some strange,
vague, and shapeless creature from legal outer
space. Thus the Committee on Penal Law and
Criminal Procedure of the New V'ork State Bar
Association opined that the new bill
"... permits a police officer, on a purely subjective reaction, to detain a citizen without any
probable cause other than his suspicion ....
Nowhere in the history of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence have we so closely approached a police
state as in this proposal to require citizens to
identify themselves to police officers and 'explain their actions' on such a meager showing."
A strong statement indeed, and a damning onewere it accurate. But troubling to dip into "the
history of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence" can be
quite a different thing from merely assuming that
it is what one might wish it to be. Sir Matthew
Hale, Serjeant William Hawkins, and our contemporary Professor Leon Radzinowicz, all reveal
that English constables and watchmen, in eras
long gone by, clearly did possess the power of
stopping-indeed, also of detaining--on mere
suspicion.'
In an English case of a century and a half ago,
Lawrence v. Hedger, 3 Taunt. 14 (1810), three
judges of Trinity Term sustained a directed
verdict for the defendant in a trespass and false
imprisonment action. The claimant had been
stopped by a watchman on a London street at ten
at night, where he had been seen with a bundle
in his hand. These judges noted, in upholding the
legality of stopping on suspicion:
"It would be extremely mischievous if it were
not so. At every Old Bailey session numbers of
persons are convicted in consequence of their
being stopped by watchmen while they are
carrying bundles in this way ....[I]n the night,
I See 2 HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 89, 97 (Wilson
ed. 1800) ("The constable may arrest suspicious night
walkers by the statute of 5 E. 3. cap. 14... ." "Their
[watchmen's] power is to arrest such as pass by until
the morning, and if no suspicion, they are then to be
delivered, and if suspicion be touching them, they shall'
be delivered to the sheriff ....
"); 2 HAwKINs, PLEAS
OF THE CRow c. 12, §20, p. 164 and c. 13 §5, p. 173
(7th ed. 1795) ("Yet it is holden by some, that any
private person may lawfully arrest a suspicious nightwalker, and detain him till he make it appear that he
is a person of good reputation." "As to the power of
watchmen, it is further enacted by the said statute of
Winchester, c. 4 'That if any stranger do pass by the
watch, .he shall be arrested until morning. And if no
suspicion be found, he shall go quit; and if they find
cause of suspicion, they shall forthwith deliver him to
the sheriff ....' "). See also 3 RADzINOwIcz, HISTORY
OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW 127 (1957).
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when the town is to be asleep, and it is the especial duty of these watchmen and other officers,
to guard against malefactors, it is highly necessary that they should have such a power of
detention. And, in this case, what do you talk
of groundless suspicion? There was abundant
ground of suspicion here. We should be very
sorry if the law were otherwise."
Up-dating "Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence" to the
twentieth century reveals that the Uniform Arrest
Act, proposed by Professor Sam Bass Warner
(then of the Harvard Law School) in 1942, presently the law in several of our Northeastern
states, uses the phrase "reasonable ground to
suspect." Also contemporaneously, our English
brethren have not succumbed to the State Bar
Committee's alarm. Reflecting both solid British
reserve and good British common sense, Cambridge Professor Glanville Williams has noted:
"Where a suspected criminal is also suspected
of being offensively armed, can the police search
him for arms, by tapping his pockets, before
making up their minds whether to arrest him?
There is no English authority, but the power is
so obviously necessary for the protection of the
police that it is difficult to believe that it can be
condemned by the courts. It might be regarded
as a reasonable extension of the existing law of
self-defense, or as an application of the doctrine
of necessity, or as an essential power of the
police in the performance of their duty of preserving the peace."2
"Reasonably suspects" may thus be a concept
sufficiently exotic to startle those New Yorkers
prone to be alarmed by any increase in police
power, but it is a concept clearly neither so original
nor so vague as to require certain judicial abnegation.
Partisans determined to ascribe vagueness to the
new law have resorted to the ingenuous strategem
of reading into it matter nowhere found within
its four corners and then concluding that the uncertainty of this interpolation renders the entire
statue vague! This tack was the one taken by the
New York Civil Liberties Union:
"That provision of the statute which states
that an officer 'may demand' the name and
address of the suspect and an explanation from
him appears to command compliance by the
suspect. This violates his rights under the Fifth
2Williams, Police Detention and Arrest PrivilegesEngland, 51 J. Cam. L., C. & P.S. 413, 418 (1960).
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Amendment to remain silent and refuse to incriminate himself. What if the suspect is unwilling to cooperate-may he be detained until
he does? Opportunity for prolonged interrogation is a dangerous threat to our system of
law." (Emphasis supplied.)
The statute, of course, does not "command" the
suspect to answer. And so this entire house of
cards tumbles: the suspect may refuse to answer;
he may not be detained until he cooperates; no
lawful opportunity for prolonged interrogation is
provided. And the conjured "dangerous threat to
our system of law" sinks appropriately, without a
ripple, into the oblivion of rhetoric.
Bona fide critics of the new law who question
how long the suspect may be held, whether he can
be brought to the station house for detention,
and whether he must answer questions put to him,
will, upon analysis, probably find their queries
traceable not to the "Stop-and-Frisk" law itself,
but to that model which the new law somewhat
resembles. The Uniform Arrest Act'-not the law
in the State of New York-permits a police officer
to detain a suspect up to two hours (apparently
at the station house) when the suspect "fails to
identify himself or explain his actions to the satisfaction of the officer." The "Stop-and-Frisk" law,
in contrast, is infinitely more limited. It contains
no such detention provision, nor any such authority
the natural force of which may be designed to
induce responses to police questioning. The "stop"
that the law permits is solely, as the statute says,
3"Section 2. Questioning and Detaining Suspects.
"(1) A peace officer may stop any person abroad who
he has reasonable ground to suspect is committing, has
committed or is about to commit a crime, and may demand of him his name, address, business abroad and
whither he is going.
"(2) Any person so questioned who fails to identify
himself or explain his actions to the satisfaction of the
officer may be detained and further questioned and
investigated.
"(3) The total period of detention provided for by
this section shall not exceed two hours. The detention
is not an arrest and shall not be recorded as an arrest
in any official record. At the end of the detention the
person so detained shall be released or be arrested and
charged with crime."
"Section 3. Searching for Weapons. Persons Who
Have Not Been Arrested.
"A peace officer may search for a dangerous weapon
any person whom he has stopped or detained to question as provided in section 2, whenever he has reasonable ground to believe that he is in danger if the person
possesses a dangerous weapon. If the officer finds a
weapon, he may take and keep it until the completion
of questioning, when he shall either return it or arrest
the person. The arrest may be for the illegal possession
of the weapon."
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for that brief time required to "demand of [the
suspect] his name, address and an explanation of
his actions" and-in appropriate instances-to
make a quick precautionary search for dangerous
weapons.
Nor is the statute's "search" provision ambiguous. In permitting the brief stopping of suspects "abroad in a public place," and their search
"for a dangerous weapon" when the officer "reasonably suspects that he is in danger of life or limb,"
it permits just that-not a fine combing of the
person for tiny heroin packets, nor a turning out of
pockets in a quest for policy slips. Customary
police self-protective practice is all that is authorized
by the "Stop-and-Frisk" law: a "patting down"
for bulky objects that may be guns or knives,
followed by a reaching into clothing or a turning
out of pockets only when such solid bulges have
been located. Concealed non-bulky contraband
is not ordinarily legally discoverable in such a
search; there would be no way of discovering itother than the rare off-chance of it's being jointly
pocketed with the weapon-like bulge!
Tm ExsnNG DEcisIONAL LAW
Judicial precedent is of little value. There are
no federal or New York cases interpreting a "stopand-frisk" type of statute. The Uniform Arrest
Law provision, as enacted in Delaware, has, it is
true, been sustained by the highest court of that
state.4 But in holding the statute constitutional
the Delaware court stated that "an attempt to
draw a distinction between an admittedly valid
detention upon 'reasonable ground to believe' and
the requirement of . . . 'reasonable ground to
suspect' is a semantic quibble." This tactic neatly
avoided the need for wrestling seriously with the
question of whether detention on "suspicion"
would be constitutional; by equating "suspicion"
and "belief" the court ignored common English
usage, and-to all intents and purposes-repealed
the statute! In the federal courts, in the absence
of a statute conferring upon police the power of
stopping (as something distinctly less than making
an arrest), there is some little indication that, inherently, police possess this power to stop. 5 At
' See DeSalvatre v. State, 163 A.2d 244, 249 (Del.
1960).
5See Henry v.United States, 361 U.S. 98, 103
(1959), especially dissent 104-06; see also Rios v.
United States, 3A U.S. 253, 261-62 (1960). For more
extended consideration, see Kaufman, J., in People v.
Bonanno, 180 F. Supp. 71, 77-83, rev'd on other grounds,

285 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1960).

best, however, this is an exceedingly murky area,
with the existing decisions letting through precious
little light.
The words of the Fourth Amendment are not
themselves dispositive of the constitutional issue.
Their ban is directed "against unreasonable
searches and seizures." The word "seizures" has
various shades of meaning. Momentary stopping to
ask a few questions is one, just barely classifiable
as a seizure. Detention for a set period of time, to
permit both questioning and other investigative
means, quite clearly is in the seizure category.
And, as seizures go, arrest is the most definitive
of the genre: the person seized then bears the
onus of being publicly charged with crime, he may
be saddled with the expense of counsel and bail,
and ultimately he is exposed to the risk of criminal
conviction. Moreover, in the phrase "unreasonable
... seizures," the noun is not the only word thus
possessed of variable meaning. The adjective
"unreasonable," chameleon-like, adopts coloration
from its surroundings. (That which is "reasonable"
beach attire is likely to be highly "unreasonable"
church finery.) Common sense would seem to
dictate that as we diminish the concept of "seizure"
from one of arrest, with the heavy burden that it
carries, to one of the briefest stopping, entailing at
most minor inconvenience, the Constitution should
not be offended if, simultaneously, fewer and less
weighty reasons are required to justify the police
action. Sparse circumstances, sufficient to render a
stopping "reasonable," may well be found "unreasonable" justification for the more lastingly
inconvenient and significant arrest.
THE FAcTs Or T

PARTICULAR

CASE ON APPEAL

One of the earliest solemn phrases a law student
learns to intone, as part of his training for membership in the elite company of lawyers and counsellors-at-law, is likely to be that of "Hard cases
make bad law." To contemporary American prose-.
cutors this should be more than a pompous
aphorism; it is a phrase to be inscribed upon the
doorposts of the mind. Had error been confessed
in the Ohio obscenity prosecution that germinated
when police-allegedly searching for a fugitive
extortionist-bomber believed to be hiding in a
private home-made a warrantless entry, forcibly
fished a pseudo search warrant out of Miss Dollree
Mapp's bosom, and ultimately prosecuted her for
dirty pictures found-not there, but concealed in
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a ba:,ement trunk-, then the exclusionary rule
articulated by a divided United States Supreme
Court in Mapp v. Ohio6 might not be the law today.
It was clearly a "hard case"; and there are those
among prosecutors and police (not, incidentally,
including this writer) who are vociferous in their
characterizations of it as "bad law."
Similar cases involving abusive conduct are
certain to arise in the future. Policemen must often
act quickly, under time and danger pressures native
to the streets in which they work, and police
judgment may be excited by the "chase" inherent
in criminal investigations. Even allowing leeway
for these items in determining whether particular
police action was or was not "reasonable," there
will always be instances of human error, instances
in which police will themselves recognize that their
colleagues' acts, scrutinized under the cold light
of the morning after, will not withstand the test
of "reasonableness." Judgment errors are inevitable when humans behave under stress, despite
the most painstaking training and the most systematic efforts at self-regulation.
But it is important that these "hard cases" not
be permitted'to be those that make our law. Much
as the spindly, homely, and solemn wallflower
may espouse virtue-having neither suffered nor
enjoyed exposure to actual temptation--our
similarly cerebral appellate courts may, on occasion, proclaim limitations upon police conduct
premised not upon reality, but only upon those
printed records they have seen. In viewing such
transcripts, these benches will be abetted by defense briefs that will take pains to underscore-nay, even to distort-all instances of alleged misconduct. This being so, prosecutors should avoid
supplying grist to the appellate mills of such nature
as will be virtually certain to sustain defense
contentions.
It is to be hoped that district attorneys will
throw in the towel in those cases (if any develop)
that stem from police "stopping" that is not premised on at least arguably reasonable suspicion,
or searches that were not at least both arguably
incident thereto and arguably necessary for the
officer's protection. Otherwise, remote appellate
courts will be prompted to believe that police in
practice view the new statute as a blank check,
justifying capricious stopping and high-handed
search. If this impression is conveyed, the courts
£ 367 U.S. 343 (1961).
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will, appropriately, interpret the law as being just
as broad as-in the judicial view-the police seem
to deem it to be. As such, it will be vague, unreasonable-and unconstitutional.
TAE "ALTA" L WmcH mE APPEAL
is TAxEN, AND TE ADEQUACY
oF BlnEFING
More than a half century ago, the State of
Oregon found, itself before the United States
Supreme Court defending the constitutionality of
its statute that barred the employment of women
for mdre than ten hours daily. The West turned to
a prominent Boston attorney, Louis Dembitz
Brandeis, for aid. Brandeis had the good sense
to do something different. His brief consisted of a
relatively short analysis of Oregon's (and other
similar) statutes, and of almost one hundred pages
of social data. This first "Brandeis brief" focussed
on society's needs as against the importance of the
employer's absolute freedom. It suggested that the
community was the loser when the female organism
suffered under relentlessly excessive strain, and
when chronic fatigue contributed heavily to immorality, to accidents, and to ailments. In February, 1908, a unanimous Supreme Court upheld
the Oregon statute, and praised Brandeis' "copious
collection" of facts?
Legislation setting maximum hours for the lal or
of women was demonstrably necessary to community well-being a half century ago. So, today, if
safeguarding our communities requires some extension-or at least clarification--of police powers,
this should be similarly demonstrable. The now
old, but still rarely used, innovation of the Brandeis
brief should be adopted as a law enforcement
appellate tool.
The data demonstrating the need for police
authority to stop suspicious persons should be
brought before the judges. If the judiciary is armed
with this data-not merely with arguments and
emotion laden conclusions-the judicial inclination may be to sustain reasonable legislative efforts
to rectify the situation. True judicial craftsmen
may be expected to respect the Cardozo injunction "to keep the balance true."
How successfully police conduct will, in actual
practice, be circumscribed cannot now be foretold.
The auguries are suspicious, however. Before the
Mapp decision of June 19, 1961, evidence lawlessly
See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412.
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obtained by police-whether pursuant to defective
detention or improper searches-was admissible
in a criminal action. Concededly, pre-Mapp, police
and prosecutors were too frequently unconcerned
with the "technicalities" of the arrest and search
laws, and the violation of such laws was too often
taken for granted. Yet there is no indication that
New York State was then in the grip of that
storm-trooper fascism that "Stop-and-Frisk"
detractors now profess to fear. Moreover, experience with search warrants since the Happ case
shows clear police compliance with existing statutory and decisional regulations. Warrants, rarely
used in New York and the other non-exclusionary
states before Mapp, have since been utilized in
vast numbers, and as a daily occurence by our
urban police. Figures reflecting this usage, and thus
expressing conscientious police efforts to comply
with vital procedural safeguards while enforcing
the substantive law, should be part of the demaonstration that is made before the appellate courts.$
Not only should statistics be available, but an
important flavor of what police will be doing under
the new statute may be supplied by reference to
particular samples of their conduct. For instance,
there are certain to be instances in which burglars
are apprehended, having initially been stopped
under the new law, although prior to July 1, 1964as in People v. Albert Brown-the cases against
them would have had to have been dismissed.
Cases should also be noted in which the "Stopand-Frisk" statute, used to prevent the commission of robberies, results in the lawful apprehension
of felons, not in their dismissal, as was initially true
in People v. Rivera,"0 which arose when there was

no statute to permit police action upon reasonable
suspicion.
CONCLUSION

In March, 1964, shortly after Governor Nelson
A. Rockefeller had signed into law the "Stop-andFrisk" bill, as well as a second item of legislation,
the so-called "Knock, Knock" bill (designed to
facilitate police conduct in executing search warrants), a self-constituted and self-styled "Emergency Committee for Public Safety" defined these
bills as "the worst police state measures ever
enacted in the history of our nation--ominously
dangerous enactments threatening a reign of unrestrained terror in our state." Although in so
saying this Committee painted a view of law
enforcement officialdom chuckling morbidly while
plotting this "reign of unrestrained terror," New
York State law enforcement moved in precisely
the opposite direction.
Both bills had been, initially, posed by representatives of the statewide organizations of chiefsof-police, police line officers, sheriffs, and district
attorneys, along with other law enforcement
colleagues, all of whom working together had
mustered legislative and executive support for
them. The bills having been signed, this coalition
continued, this time seeking to minimize the chance
that a single .constable, in any remote township
in the state, misguided by the calamitist interpretions of the new laws, might arrogate unto
himself powers that the statutes clearly did not
bestow. Functioning through their New York
State Combined Council of Law Enforcement
Officials, these associations took prompt steps to
train every single enforcement officer in the State
The extent of current misinformation as to police
as to the limitations inherent in the new legislapractice, certain to have its impact on appellate judgments, cannot be overstated. At a forum in which this tion.
writer recently participated, one of America's most
A month after the Mapp decision's first birthday,
eminent law professors, renowned particularly in the the suggestion was made at
a conference of the
fields of criminal and constitutional law, discussing
New York State Association of Chiefs of Police
post-Mapp law enforcement, stated-in substancethat the requirement that the police procure search that law enforcement would be able to work efwarrants, was solely of academic and not real interest.
In support of this statement e cited a pre-Mapp fectively under the exclusionary rule in the future,
statistic showing how rarely warrants had then been were but three items of legislation enacted.u One,
used in Detroit, but he did not indicate that the statistic permitting misdemeanor arrests on probable
failed to reflect the current picture! The exclusionary
nile has in fact had the very real effect of forcing police cause, rather than barring police action until
to live by-or, at least, the scoffers would contend, to police certainty existed, was passed during the
testify by-these rules of criminal procedure imposed
by the legislatures and the courts.
"The talk, given in July, 1962, was reprinted:
'32 Misc. 2d 846 (1962).
see Kuh, The Mapp Case One Year After: An Ap1038 Misc. 2d 586, aff'd, 19 A.D.2d 863 (Ist Dep't
praisal of Its Impact in New York, 148 N.Y.L.J. nos.
1963), reversed, 14 N.Y.2d 441 (July 10, 1964).
55-56, p. 4, Sept. 18-19, 1962.
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1963 Legislative Session and has been effective
since July 1, 19 63 .2 Despite dire forebodings of
abuse-much akin to those presently reverberatng-that act provided a -holesome and wisely
used tool, of great aid in safeguarding our communities. The other two items then suggested, a
"Stop-and-Frisk" and a "'Knock, Knock" bill
became effective in New York July 1, 1964.
I- See New York Session Laws. 1963, ch. 580, amending §177(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to
permit an officer to arrest when he has "reasonable
grounds for believing that a crime is being committed
in his presence."
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If all three of these acts are wisely used by police
and realistically policed-and sustained-by the
courts, it is hoped that our communities will learn
that the guardians of peace and safety whom they
have designated are to be trusted safely to invoke
sorely needed lawful weapons. Such recognition
would be an important start towards such a policecommunity concordat that all may come to recognize the fruitlessness of continuing to preach
antipathy-ineed, hate-between the people and
their servants, the police.

